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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
CALINOIS LAND COMPANY a
limited partnership, consisting ~f
ROBERT E. OVERTREE and
DAVID T. SHIFFMAN,
general partners,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
SECURITY
. TITLE COMPANY '
a corporation,
Defendant-Respondent,
vs.
JOHN W. CUNNINGHAM,
Interpleader-Respondent.

Case No.
12962

APPELLANT'S BREIF
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This action involves the sale of certain real property known as Evergreen Park Subdivision #I located in Weber County, State of Utah. The sale was
made by the plaintiff herein to the defendant John
W. Cunningham pursuant to a Trust Deed with defendant, Security Title Company acting as trustee.
Upon the default of defendant Cunningham, the
plaintiff commenced an action in the Third District
Court in Salt Lake County, Civil No. 184745. That
action was settled pursuant to a stipulation between
1

the parties, said stipulation covering 500 of the 553
lots initially conveyed by the plaintiff to the defendant, Cunningham. This action was brought to recover the remaining 53 lots which defendant Security
Ti'tle had subsequently conveyed out of trust.
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
The District Court of the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah by
the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, after hearing oral
representations of counsel at a pretrial conference,
summarily dismissed plaintiff's complaint upon the
grounds that said action was properly adjudicated
in the prior action and therefore the prior action was
res adjudicata as a bar to plaintiff's present action.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiff seeks a reversal of the Lower
Court's decision and requests that this action be remanded to the trial court for a trial on the merits.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff believes that the facts in this particular case are properly set forth in a succinct manner on pages 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and a portion of page 7 in
Judge Croft's Memorandum Decision and Order of
Dismissal. Therefore, the plaintiff will not take the
time to reiterate those facts at this particular time,
but would direct the Court's attention to the facts as
set forth therein. (R. 102 through 107.)
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE LOWER COURT TO
SUMMARILY DISMISS THE PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT INASMUCH AS THERE EXIST
FACTS HEREIN UPON WHICH REASONABLE
MEN MAY DRAW DIFFERING CONCLUSIONS.

Momentarily bypassing the question of res adjudicata the plaintiff contends that there exist a myriad of facts in this somewhat complex transaction
that would substantially uphold a judgment in favor
of the plaintiff for the relief prayed for in plaintiff's
complaint herein.
It is imperative that we point out but a few of
the afore-alleged facts. ( 1) The record discloses no
evidence of an agreement by and between defendant
Cunningham and the plaintiff herein wherein the
plaintiff agreed to accept the terms of defendant
Cunningham's letter dated November 1, 1968. (R.
18) To the contrary there appears in a directive letter from defendant Cunningham to defendant Security Title Company inference that the plaintiff herein
would accept 20,625 shares of Dumont Corporation
Stock, cash in the sum of $7,500.00, and a Promissory Note and Deed of Trust in the principal sum of
$82,500.00 from Dumont Corporation covering "the
same 500 lots." (R. 32) These were the terms agreed
upon by the parties when negotiating the settlement
of the initial lawsui't brought by the plaintiff herein
3

to recover the 500 lots that have been the subject of
the Exchange Agreement between defendant Cunnigham and Dumont Corporation. Plaintiff at no
time intended that its entire interest in the initial
Trust Deed covering the 553 lots would be settled
pursuant to the above terms.
(2) The deposition of Herbert H. Halliday, Jr.,
in Civil No. 193327, the present action herein, certainly indicates tha:t he was aware that Calinois had
no intent of transferring its entire interest in the
Trust Deed for the consideration set forth in defendant Cunningham's instructional letter of November 11, 1968.
POINT II.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE DEFENSE OF RES ADJUDICATA WAS A PROPER BAR TO THE PROSECUTION OF THE PRESENT ACTION.

We find a definition of res adjudicata most generally accepted in 46 Am. Jur. 2d, "Judgments," §394.
"Literally, res adjudicata means a matter
adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment."
Further, in §401 we find the following:
doctrine of res adjudicata is a principle of universal jurisprudence, forming a
part of the legal systems of all civilize.d nations. The doctrine is firmly entranced m t~e
law, as to those situations to which it is apph·
~'The
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cable. Situations may arise, however, which
call for exceptions, and, in the event the doctrine should not be enlarged beyond' its clear
limits."
The question of the applicability of the doctrine
of res adjudica:ta implies the resolving of a question
of both fact and law. The question of fact that must
be decided in each and every action involves the identity of the subject matter of the previous litigation as
compared to the subject matter of the present litigation. It is this identification factor that poses the
matrix of the plaintiff's appeal herein. It is also this
identification factor upon which the lower court has
premised its conclusions. Therefore, a most rigorous
examination of the continuity of issues or the lack
thereof in the two actions poses the most pressing
problem at this time. Quoting from 46 Am. Jur. 2d,
"Judgments," §407, we 'find the following:
"Indeed in order for two actions to be regarded as based on the same cause of action
so that a judgment in one is a bar to the maintenance of the other action, the two actions
must relate to the same subject matter; where
the subject matter is essentially .different,
there is no identity of causes of act10n. However the mere fact that two actions relate to
the ~ame subject matter does not necessarily
establish that they are on the same cause of
action. Hence, a judgment in a former action
does not operate as a bar !o a. subsequent action where the cause of action 1s not the same,
even though each action relates to the same
subject matter."
5

The plaintiff admits that in instituting the initial action in the previous lawsuit that the default
of defendant Cunnngham was sought and hence a reconveyance of the property held by defendant Security Title Company. However, during the course of
negotiation and settlement pertaining to said lawsuit
only that portion of the subject matter of the lawsuit
dealing with the Exchange Agreement was covered
by the Settlement Agreement and General Release.
Wherein we note that the parties agreed as follows:
"Whereas, the parties hereto have agreed
upon the terms and settlement of all claims
arising from said Exchange Agreement and
said lawsuit and have agreed that the conveyance of said lots to Dumont may be completed
and the judgment may be entered dismissing
said lawsuit with prejudice." (R. 46)
It will be noted that the proposed settlement was
based or premised upon the Exchange Agreement
and inasmuch as the Exchange Agreement called for
the conveyance of only 500 of the 553 lots, the subject matter then of the Settlement Agreement and
General Release must be limited to those lots specifically outlined in the Exchange Agreement. Again
the opening paragraph of the Settlement Agreement
and General Release evidences the tripartite agreement was to be directed only to the Exchange Agreement attached to the Settlement Agreement and General Release as Exhibit A and covering only 500 of
the original 553 lots. ( R. 46) In executing the Settlement Agreement and General Release the plaintiff
6

agreed to accept the terms contained therein in full
settlement of its claim and interest in the 500 lots
formed the subject matter of the Exchange Agreement. It will be noted that included in the attached
Settlement Agreement and General Release there is
incorporated the statement that John Cunningham
and the defendant Dumont Corporation under date
of October 8, 1968 made and entered into an Exchange Agreement, a copy of which is attached thereto and expressly made a part thereof. The dispute
arose between Calinois Land Company, Security
Title Company, John Cunningham and Dumont Corporation as to the rights, duties and obligations of
the parties under said Exchange Agreement. Further, such Settlement Agreement recites that Calinois Land Company filed a lawsuit in the District
Court of Salt Lake County in which Dumont Corporation intervened. The parties to the Settlement
Agreement premised the terms of the settlement upon
the claims arising from the Exchange Agreement. It
will be noted that the Settlement Agreement refers
to and is restricted to the Exchange Agreement. It
is the proposition of the plaintiff herein that the settlement is only limited to the 500 lots as referred to
in said Exchange Agreement which is part of the
Settlement Agreement. Defendant Security Title
Company in the action before the lower court was
charged with conveying 53 lots out of trust which
were not incorporated or made a part of the Exchange Agreement but which are a part of the Trust
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Agreement which defendant Cunningham and plaintiff initially signed. The Settlement Agreement and
General Release formed a basis upon which the initial
lawsuit was dismissed. Further evidence of the intent of the parties can be found in the instructional
letter by defendant John Cunningham dated the first
day of November, 1968 wherein it is clearly set forth
in the second paragraph therein that Calinois Land
Company was to receive 20,625 shares of Dumont
Corporation stock as its share in closing the "transaction" that forms the subject matter of that particular instructional letter. It will be noted from the
first paragraph therein that the subject matter of
that letter was the Exchange Agrrement and Management Agreement that was delivered to defendant
Security Title Company directing Security to act as
escrow agent in closing that particular transaction.
It is further contended by the plaintiff herein
that the failure of the interpleader and respondent
John W. Cunningham to answer in this action has
deprived the plaintiff of its right to make inquiry
and to take discovery concerning 'Mr. Cunningham's
intention and state of mind when entering into the
Settlement Agreement and General Release set forth
above. Without this opportunity the plaintiff's posi·
tion has been substantially prejudiced, inasmuch as
the plaintiff contends that the defendant Cunningham knew that the settlement and resultant dismis·
sal of the initial lawsuit was premised solely on the
Exchange Agreement and was not intended as a
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complete release of the plaintiff's right, title and interest in any remaining properties covered by the
original trust agreement.

CONCLUSION
Analyzation of the nature and determining factors resolved in the Settlement and General Release
resolving the disputes between the parties in the initial action clearly and unequivocally shows that the
intent of the parties was to arrive at a settlement and
termination of the disputes as they revolved around
the Exchange Agreement involving all the parties
to that initial lawsuit. The subject mater of the present lawsuit was not negotiated upon nor settled by
the parties at tha:t particular time and hence the
claim or defense of res adjudicata is inapplicable to
the present action. By the summary disposition entered by the lower court the plaintiff has been prevented from introducing substantial and convincing
evidence upon which reasonable men could conclude
that the subject matter of the initial lawsuit and the
subject matter of the present lawsuit are separate
and distinct. We therefore petition this Honorable
Court to reverse the summary disposition of the lower
court and remand this action for further proceedings
in accordance with the plea of the prayer of the plaintiff's complaint and thus allowing the plaintiff its
right to have its matter heard in open court.
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Respectfully submitted this 19th day of October,
1972.
LOUIS H. CALLISTER, SR.
GARY R. HOWE
of CALLISTER, KESLER &
CALLISTER
800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
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